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Few would assert that the current governance model for

managing the nation's public lands.' which grants exclusive
authority to the federal government, has protected the natural resource values of those lands or provided a framework
for the harmonious resolution of 'conflicts over their use.2
Dissatisfaction is apparent from recurrent proposals to privatize public lands3 or to devolve their ownership to the
states.4 The emergence of the "wise use" and "county
supremacy" movements directly challenges the authority of
the federal government to manage its land.5 While this nevw
state and local assertiveness is not without historical basis
nor completely without merit.6 its proponents have yet to
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Public Lands and Public Benefits (Oct. 1-13. 1995 . and on testimony she
gave before the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on
Forests and Public Lands M1.anagement, on November 2. 1995. The author
would like to thank Peter Byrne. Vicki Jackson, Richard Lazarus. and Doug
Parker for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and
Barbara Rich, the authors research assistant, for her invaluable assistance
and attention to detail in preparing this article for publication.
1.The meaning of the term 'public lands" has varied greatly, While the
term is most frequently used to mean all land owned by the United States.
at various points in time, the phrase has been synonymous with the term
-public domain lands,' the provenance and meaning of which is also a matter of some confusion and ambiguity. This article uses the terms public
lands and public domain lands Interchangeably to refer only to the lands
managed by the Bureau of Land Management (B6W.). See GEozca. C.
Cosoai;s. Pusuc NAsruP Rsswcucs Lxv§ 1.102111 (1990)for further explication of the meaning of these and othercomparable terms.
2. The Western historian Patricia Limerick refers to this conflict as an
'infinitely sustainable boxing match" Patricia Limerick A HIstory eftfie Put
Lands DtEate, Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado
School of Law conference, Challenging Federal Ownership and
Management. Public Lands and Public Benefits (Oct. 11-13. 1995)lpaper in
the possession of the author).
3. James L Huffman, PuEL Lands Manatiinent in an Ag of Deregulationand
Pnvalizalion. 10 Pu. L:D L REv 29 (1939) (urging abandonment of presumption favoring public management in favor of examination of institutional alternatives, such as pivate control). But see Joseph L Sax. T"e
Legillmacy ci Clzth'e Values IntfCam cl PufE: Land. 56 U.Cow. L Rm. 537
(1985) (preferring collective values to atomistic individual ones).
4. For a comment highly critical of delegating to states a role in managing national natural resources such as Yellov,-stone National Park. see Richard
Schneebeck, Comment. State Pa o;pationIn FedraIPc.j bkfrg[:r
theYelostone
Eestc! : A Meaningful S:uti:n crBusinos as Usual?. 21 Lx;o &Vmza L Ray. 397
(1986) (explaining that serious deficiencies in state leislation, limited state
Jurisdiction and national interests require retained federal control).
5.The wise use and county supremacy movements are well-organized
efforts in the West opposing increased environmental protection on federal
lands and the acquisition by the federal govemment of more public lands
for preservation purposes. See Anita P Miller. All Is Not Ouztl on the Western
Frnt The Bs2e1forPubtrLands. 25 U.n Lv 827 (1993) (describing and ana-

lyzing legal basis of wise use, county supremacy movements). Rene Erm 11,
Tfe 'Wise Use" Mc.ernenl Tfe Constulinat, of Lczao
Abn on FederalLands Under
the Prenpzion D::nne. 30 lDwsio L Rav.631 (1993-94) (concluding that county land use plans requiring federal agencies to include county governments
in their management and planning processes are a valid constitutional
response to preservationist policies).
6. Sally K.Fairfax et al.. Feeralihsm and thi
wVil and Scenf: Rivers Art: Now,
You See It, Now You Don't. 59 W'Mi. L RE. 417 (1934); Richard H. Cowart &
Sally K.Fairfax, Puflic Lands Federasm:Jui-alTzonj andAdministratihz Rea ty.
15 Ecot-"= LO,375 (1988).
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than complete
offer a workable solution other
7
ouster of the federal sovereign.
Emerging theorems in conservation biology and
ecology which are changing our view of the natural
landscape, are placing additional strains on the current model. What once was a highly localized decision about how a specific piece of land within a fixed
geo-political boundary should be managed, has
gained regional (even global) implications. 8
Ecologists are convincingly demonstrating that effective natural resource management implicates more
than one governing authority in the management
task, requiring consultation and coordination among
political lurisdictions.9
Ecologists and conservation biologists are also
teaching us that chaos and diversity are more appropriate biological goals than equilibnum and single specie
restoration.O The contemporary ecological paradigm
recognizes that natural systems are open and not necessarily in equilibrium and that the focus of the paradigm should be on process or the "tralectory of change,"
rather than on the final endpoint.i IIf,
as conservation
biologists contend, a landscape is composed of a
mosaic of patches, each shifting in composition over
time, then decisions about the management of these
systems must include the capacity to adapt to new

information and unanticipated systemic changes. 12
To realize the goals of conservation biology and
ecosystem management, the institutions that govern
these systems must be able to work together harmoniously, across political boundary lines and into a
biologically uncertain future. 13 The rigidity of the current public lands model creates substantial barriers
to the achievement of these goals. 4
The era of special interest dominance of public
lands policy may be over as well. The cattle and timber barons and hard rock miners who have ruled the
public lands under a battery of nineteenth-century
laws and policies, Charles Wilkinson's "lords of yesterday," 15 are giving way to multiple public lands
"communities." 16 The West is now a variegated landscape of divers communities loosely bound together in a patchwork of shared interests, occupations,
and geographic locations, not by a single philosophy of commodity extraction. 17 Governance institutions and procedures designed to accommodate
bipolar conflicts among powerful special interests
over the consumption of natural resources are illsuited for conflicts in this new polycentric world,' 8
This article's working premise is that unless the
current governance structure for the management of
public lands changes, the political conflicts over their

7. cf. BERNARD SHANKS, THiS LAND Is YOUR LAND (1984) (arguing for retention of federal ownership).

transboundary ecosystems. Robert B. Kelter, Taking Account of tie
Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and Ecology In theGreater
Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L.REV.923 (1989).

8. Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology,
69 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994)j
9. Robert B. Keiter NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem
Management on the Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 43 (1990);
Reed F. Noss, Some Pnnciples of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHL-KENT L. REV. 893,907 (1994) (explaining
that ecosystem management requires cooperation among agencies and landowners and coordination of inventory, research,
monitoring, and management activities).
10. Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of
Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHi.-KEr L.
REV. 847, 869-71 (1994) (stating that resource management has
become a grand and "risky" expenment, in which human change
is viewed as lust one more "flux).
11. Meyer, supra note 8, at 877.
12. Meyer, supra note 8, at 881-82. See also Professor William
Rodgers who contends that conservation biology has undermined
the present legal superstructure, because that structure is based
on a preference for static legal conservation techniques like acquisition of fee simple absolute title to land, removal of resident
human populations from condemned lands, parcel-by-parcel evaluations, and what he labels an "ark' configuration (management
of species by isolation within impermeable boundaries). William
H. Rodgers, Ir., Adaption of Environmental Law to the Ecologists' Discovery
of Disequilibna, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 887 (1994).

13. The need to create institutional and process harmony in
the management of these natural systems is illustrated by the
rapid development of private and state-owned lands surrounding
our national parks. This development is decreasing the cushioning effect those lands once had for the public resources, eroding
the federal land managers ability to protect the federal portion of

14. Joseph L. Sax. Nature and Habitat Conservation and Proteclon
in the United Stales, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q, 47 (1993) (criticizing what he
labels the historic "enclave strategy' approach to public lands
management).
1i. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDiAu; LAND,

WATER, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE WEST 17 (1992),
16. Sarah F. Bates, Public Lands Communities: In Search of a
Community of Values, 14 Pus. LAND L. REV. 81 (1993). For an even earlier exposition of the ideas contained in Bates' article, see Joseph
L. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights?. The National Parks as a Laboratory
of New Ideas, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV.499 (1984).
17. For example, Raymond Rasker reports that the Rocky
Mountain West has added over 2 million new jobs from 1969 to
1991. most of which were in "service-related" occupations. Again,
according to Rasker, in 1969. over 11% of all direct employment
and 9.6% of personal income in the region were in natural
resource industries (mining, farming, ranching or lumber); by
1991. these combined industries represented less than 6% of all
employment and less than 5% of all personal income, while the
service industries, in 1991. represented over 81% of employment
and 68% of labor income. Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old
Vistas: The Economic Role of Environmental Ouality in Western Public
Lands. 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 369, 377 (1994), See also SARAH F. BATES
Er
At.. SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE ANDREDISCOVERY IN
WESTERN WATER POLICY (1993); Cowart & Fairfax. supra note 6;
Bates, supra note 16. For an even earlier exposition of the ideas
contained in Bates' article, see Sax, supra note 16.
18. Conservation biology's "adaptive management"
approach with its emphasis on diversity and flux may offer a useful prism through which to view these new public land communities as well.
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use and management will continue to blight their

future, just as it has marred their past) 9 Further, failing to adapt the management of public lands to our
changing perceptions about the nature and needs of
the biological and social communities that depend
upon them will only engender a new generation of
conflicts and further diminish the vitality of those
communities.2 0 Nowhere are these conflicts more
intense and the risks and consequences of failure
higher than on the "public domain" lands; those
lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) under the authority of the Federal Land Policy
2
& Management Act (FLPMA). '
The purpose of this article is to determine
whether there are alternatives models of federalism,
which might improve the management of public
domain lands.2 None of the models discussed
19. The article assumes that the present public lands management model is too broken to be fixed with minor changes to
existing public lands laws and institutions, and that the current
paradigm cannot be saved. Therefore, the models discussed In
this Article are presumed to be substitutes fqr, not amendments
or supplements to. that model.
20. According to Rasker community stability can best be
assured by economic diversity. Rasker. supra note 17, at 391.
Rasker goes on to make the point that the cornerstone of an economic diversity strategy is the creation of a favorable business
climate and the protection of the cultural, social, and environmental qualities that make a community a pleasant place In
which to live and do business. Id.
21.43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1994).

22. This article looks at 'federalism- as an organizing principle of Amencan government, as a theory of institutions, in which
what is most important is the allocation of power between federal and state governments. Phrases used in this Article, like 'federalism structure" or -federalism model- refer to the apportionment of day-to-day management authority over public domain
lands between the federal and state governments. The focus of
this Article is on the very practical problems that that apportionment must solve. Less doctrinal and more theoretical questions
about principled- notions of federalism. derived from the constitutional debates over our federal structure of govemment or from
more modem prudential concerns, and their application to the
allocation of power on the nation's public lands, while beyond
the scope of this Article. are currently under examination by the
author. For a more in depth exposition of this distinction, see H.
Jefferson Powell, Te Oldest Ouestion of ConstitutionalLaw. 79 VA. L
REv. 633 (1993). For a closer look at the complexity of how power
is distributed between the political institutions of state and fed.
eral governments in the latter part of the twentieth century, see
Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism. 47 VAND.L.Rc. 1485 (1994).
23. The Article does not address the question of who should

own the public lands. Therefore. issues of state or county devo-

lution and pnvatization are not discussed, nor is the validity of
the normative goals set out in the public lands laws. since none
of the models requires their change.
24. Professor A- Dan Tarlock sets forth many of these rationales in his article. A. Dan Tarlock. National Power. State Resource
Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980s: Scaling Amenca's Magic
Mountain, 32 KAN. L REv. II 1, 121-22 (19831. A more refined look
at the question than is offered here might also examine the purpose for which the land is being managed and the conflicts that
might arise from that management, the strength of the federal
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here, however, proposes complete recision of federal authority over public lands; rather they offer an
enhanced role for states in the federal decisionmaking process.2 3 A continuing federal presence is
assumed to be necessary to prevent inter-state distributional inequities from arising or economic discrimination from occumng. Only the federal govemnment can correct market failures when they
occur and uniformly protect national norms, such
as our natural heritage.2 4 And even if the WVestem
states are becoming more supportive of these
norms as some assert.25 serious questions would
remain about the ability of those states to take on
sole responsibility for management6 of these lands
without an infusion of new funds.2

The article examines three models of governance (dual regulation," "collaborative manageInterest in the particular land or resource being managed, the
Impact of the decision on local interests, the extent of parity
between the competing jurisdictional interests, and the irreversibility of the consequences.

25. Some find this a dubious assumption and question
whether an enhanced state role on public lands can be consistent
with environmental protection, S. e-,. S'hneebeck. supra note 4.
But 4f, Cowart &Fairfax. supra note 6 Jeffre; L BEile. AComparson cf
the FerderalConsisteri Dxntnrz Ur.k1r FLP,%.A an; C,.: CZM.,A. 9 VA.E2.-,T_
Li. 207. 217 (1989). The courts have found no such Inconsistency
supporting what might be called a -rejuvenated federalism7--an
enhanced state role in the administration of eraronmental programs, ingeneral, and on public lands, inparticular. John D.Leshy
Granite Rock and t::Sia IruelurgeO:r Fe*ralLand tWer.
18 Er-rTL L
99 (1937). NewYotkv United States, 505 US. 144 (1992j: Califoma
Coastal Commrn v,Granite Rock Co. 489 US. 572 (1987),
Astrong theoretical argument can also be made that states
should play some roe in management of these lands. These arguments are based on the recognized ro!e states play in our federal
s stem of government Core federalism values commonly associated with the states include pre-ervation of liberty. civic participation
and diversity. For further exposition of this thought and its consequences, see TE FcEapuasr Nos 10. 45 (lames Madisonl (Clinton
Rossiter ed.. 1961); Richard B.Stewvart. M ons NE1imare. 57 U.Con
L REv 335 (1990) (arguing that the very factions Madison feared at
the local level. necessitating a strong federal sovereign. have taken
over government at the national level). Po.ell. supra note 22. at
631-8 . Ste a' Ann Althouse. Vanarlns on a T"Ey cJr~orNmatve
Fderalsm:A Supr'.me Ccut D 21-yu.e 42 Duxc LI. 979 (1993) (convergence on normative principle that federalism is important because
It protects rights of citizens).
One could also argue from the vantage of political expediency that maintaining some measure of state control over management of these lands vill enhance the legitimacy of that management, and from the vantage of administrative efficiency that
the complexity of land use issues of this nature suggests that
effective regulation and enforcement should be grounded in
knowledge of specific local conditions. Sze lames H.k/ickersham.
The QOuilel Rv:lulfn Coninues. The EmergingN.o MciA far Stale Grmxt
Manaetment Slatutes, 18 HA-.,. Epr=. L Rcv. 489. 529-30 (1994)
(applying this reasoning to advocate on behalf of a consistency
model for land use planning under which local governments
maintain a strong presence subject to state oversight).
26. Cowart and Fairfax argue that growth in the states7
capacity to manage environmental resources is a critical component In the push to devise a new scheme of public land management. Cowart & Fairfax. supra note 6.
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ment" and "layered federalism") found in other
areas of environmental law to determine whether
their application to public domain lands might
lessen the federalism tensions inherent in the current model and enhance the land manager's ability
to make decisions that are both ecologically sound
and reflect the new voices populating theses
lands.2 7 Achieving rational ecosystem management
and a more democratic mode of decisionmaking
may be of greater importance than attaining nonfractious governance. Intergovernmental friction
may be a necessary, unavoidable, even welcome byproduct of our "compound republic" form of government; a transaction costs of a federal structure that
relies on overlapping and sometimes conflicting
lurisdictions of governance to safeguard those liberties not protected by the explicit constitutional
guarantees.2 8 No such benefit accrues from the

the problems besetting public lands management.
While the author recognizes tht these problems may
be too complex, diverse and endogenous to the
public lands experience or a specific geographic
area to enable a "single size fits all solution," she
hopes that the analytical exercise of examining
these models may enrich the storehouse of ideas
we draw from in the search for solutions.

27. There are models which change the basic constitutional
federalism design (such as might be suggested by English land
use law), create new governmental entities (public corporations),
or make use of interstate agreements (interstate compacts).
which might solve some or even all of the problems associated
with management of public domain lands. How far our institutions and systems of governance should be restructured in-the
search for a solution to the public lands' dilemma, however
worthwhile an inquiry, is beyond the scope of this Article.
Therefore, while the models examined here each shifts the balance of power and realigns the working relationships between the
three levels of government, none restructures that basic framework. The author also recognizes that any acceptable substitute
paradigm would, in addition, have to avoid unsettling long-held
public and private expectations, creating unnecessary costs, or
fostering distributional inequities. However, such an analysis of
the extent to which each of the models might avoid these impacts
is also beyond the scope of this Article.
28. Dave Froynmayer, A New Look at Federalism: The Theory and
Implicationsof Dual Sovereignty, 12 ENvrL. L.903, 912 (1982). Indeed,
the Federalists envisioned that friction between the central government and the several states might even come to a show of
force, which they countenanced because of the importance of the
states in protecting the nghts of the people. See, e.g., THE
FEDERA!.ST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (states are to "sound the
alarm" if the conduct of the national rulers appeared improper
and serve not only as the voice but the "Arm" of the people's dis-

their common liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence"). THE

II. The Prevailing Federalism Or "Dominant
Federal" Model

The current governance model on public domain
lands grants the federal government legal primacy or
dominance over those lands 30 The salient feature of
the "dominant federal" model is that the federal government administers resource management programs on public domain lands by itself. There is no
29
statutorily mandated management role for the
other two problems.
The structure of the article is straightforward.
states. BLM issues grazing permits, mining patents,
oil, gas, coal, and geothermal leases, and offroad
Part I1examines the current federalism model on
vehicles permits, not the state land management
public domain lands and concludes, despite some
agency. The state has no legal authority to manage
of its virtues, the model has caused inter-governmental friction and created barriers to rational
the natural resources that are the sublect of these
ecosystem management and community-based parauthorizations, even when their management directticipation in the decisionmaking process. Part IIl ly implicates the state's vital interests.31
describes and then critiques each of the alternative
There have been experiments with more
"cooperative" or reciprocal models of federalism
federalism designs against the same three criteria.
32
The article concludes by suggesting which, if any of
on public lands at various points in our history,
but none of these has significantly changed the
the models holds the greatest promise for resolving

content). and THE FEDERAUST No. 46 (lames Madison) (stating that

opposed to the United States would be "amilitia amounting to
near half a million citizens with arms in their hands ... fighting for

FEDERAUST (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in Kramer, supra note
22, at 1515-17.
29. This article does not disaggregate complaints about the
management of public lands that reflect only the self-Interests of
single user groups from those who champion a broader public
cause and maximization of the public's share of the distributional benefits from these lands. In the author's opinion, the former
should be entitled to little deference in any discussion about
managing public resources, and should not by themselves cause
any changes in the present federalism model.
30. For greater information about the application of this
precept to rangeland, see George C, Coggins, The Law of Public
Rangeland Management IV FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use
Mandates, 14 ENVTL. L. 1(1983),
3 1. The rigidity and absurdity of this arrangement Is perhaps
best illustrated in the case of so-called "checkerboard lands," an
eponymous pattern of western land ownership reflective of the
historic public lands disposition practices of the nineteenth century, where each jurisdiction manages its squared subpart of the
renewable and nonrenewable resource In accordance with Its
management goals and directives.
32. See. e.g., Bowen Blair, Ir., The Columbia River Gorge Naional
Scenic Area: The Act, Its Genesis and Legislative History, 17 ENVrL L, 863
(1987); Cowart & Fairfax. supra note 6, at 421-39 (discussing a
variety of administrative techniques that have been utilized by
state, local and federal resource managers to manage public
domain resources cooperatively).
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balance of power between the federal government
and the states.3 3 Laws like the National
Environmental Policy Act 34 and the Endangered
Species Act 35 require little more than consultation
with state agencies, giving the states no power
over federal agency decisions. FLPMA's "consistency" provisions 36 stop well short of giving states and
local communities a land use planning-based veto
over activities on public domain lands.3 7 On public
domain lands, the federal government is. as the
model's title implies, "dominant."
While the "dominant federal" model, with its
unitary sovereign, provides some assurances that
national norms will be met and that distributional
inequities between regions will be minimized, the
model has caused problems for public lands governance. The model's dependence upon central-

ized. coercive control over state action is responsible for much of the tension and frustration fueling
the "county supremacy" and "wise use movements. 38 By offering only a single target for
takeover, the model allowed special interests to
capture federal land management agencies 39 with
calamitous results for the natural resource base 0
And, by largely excluding states from the management exercise, the model has done little to
encourage states to develop their own natural
resource management capabilities, perpetuating
the myth of state inability and unwillingness to
assume a more active management role over these
41
resources.

33. Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6. at 408 (histoncal, physical and fiscal realities have led federal and state governments to
share de facto management of public lands ). For a more theoretical exposition of the same conduslon. see Kramer. supra note
22 (political parties, structure of administrative state, exit rights,
and cultural commonalities link fortunes of federal and state
office holders in a reciprocal dependence requinng each to pay
attention to needs of other).

39. Waux-ism. supra note 15; Coggins. supra note 30.
40. While the condition of BL24 rangeland has improved, in
1991 35% w1as still dassified by the Council on Environmental
Ouality as poor or fair. compared to 82% in 1936. Cou;CIL o:U
EErimTAL Ouw~m. E,,,7o~.i~r. GuArm Tim Tusrg'-'ric
kirruAi REFc.-T OF THE Cou:cc.i
-w. o:mteNT Outure. fig. 24b,
at 346 (1992). For an analysis of the impaca of grazing on public
lands, see Myles I.Watts &leffreyT. LaFrance. Ccess. CefEys. and
Coniro.nrj: T.e Grazing Fee Issue. In MuLnaz Co:irucrs Ovz,
MuLmFLE UsE. PoLmcAL Eco:;.t'm REs ncH Car rm 59 (Terry L
Anderson ed.. 1994). Sez aWr Huffman, supra note 3. at 49;
\Vfuw;so;. supra note 15; Coggins, supra note 30.
41. Fairfax, t aL assert that state environmental management capabilities (ie., the political and legal authority authonzIng states to administer natural resource laws, the states institutional capacity to implement these laws and the availability of a
relevant information-base) have improved as a result of experience administering pollution control laws and interacting with
federal government under multiple-use statutes. Fairfax et al..
supranote 6. Others argue that the experience under the multipleuse statutes has been too limited to give states comparable
expertise in the natural resource management area. Schneebeck
supra note 4 (state legislation rarely addresses issues like establishing priorities between competing uses of natural resources. is
frequently fragmented between different state agencies and few.
if any mechanisms for requiring coordination between interested
agencies exist at the state level). Melinda Bruce &Teresa Rice.
Conlralling iJFBlue Rash. Issufs and Trends In State Land Manzg.,ment.
29 Lo &VAEn L REv 1 (1994) (modifications must be made in
existing state land use management practices for long-term sustainability of the resources on those lands): C. Maison
Heidelberg. Note. CLsiing t.e Bc k en S&:o1 Trust Lands. 45 VMro. L
R-v. 1581 (1992) (modification of the framework governing management of state school trust lands is warranted).
42. Public lands law virtually zones public lands for various
uses. For example, if a mining claim for a hard rock mineral is
filed, the land is dedicated to hard rock mineral development
regardless of other present or future uses it might sustain. 30
U.S.C. ff 22-39 (1994). Even public domain lands, which are to
be managed under a multiple-use sustained yield standard.
Multiple-1ise Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§528-31
(1994). which Implies some co-existence of different uses, are, in
fact. managed to achieve either range use values, public recreational values or wilderness values, but not all of these values at
one time, because the managers lack the tools and the will to reconcile the resulting conflicts. Coggins. supra note 30. at 63-65.

34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70d (1994). See d.§ 4332 (preparation
of environmental impact statements); Cowart & Fairfax. supra
note 6, at 415 n.211 (discussing the extent to which NEPA
Guidelines have been incorporated in BLM planning regulations).
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994). See Ed.§ 1536. See alo Id.§
1535 (state cooperative agreements).
36. FLPMA § 202(c)(8) requires that the Secretary's land use
plans shall provide for compliance" with federal and state pollution control laws. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(8) (1994). FLPMA 202(c)(9)
imposes a consistency obligation on those plans to 'tfie maximum extent Ithe Secretaryl finds consistent with Federal law and
the purposes of this Act" 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994). These
requirements have been interpreted by BIM as requiring "consideration" of resource-related plans and polices of state and
local governments." 43 C.ER. § 1610.3-2(e) (1995); Cowart &
Fairfax. supra note 6. at 417.
37. Leshy. supra note 25. Even Cowart and Fairfax. who cite
the consistency language in FLPMAas providing a statutory basis
for more cooperative federal-state-local management of public
lands, admit that the importance of these provisions is "probably
more political and symbolic than legal." noting the language
does not give the states a veto over federal programs or initiatives and that the federal land manager has ultimate authority to
determine whether federal programs are consistent with state
and local priorities and even to over-nde those priorities to
achieve federal objectives. Cowart & Fairfax. supra note 6. at 418.
See also Boyle, supra note 25. at 220-21 (noting that under FLPM:s
coordination mandate. "Itlhere are no structural guarantees that
views of state and local governments or the public will be taken
into account as the Act does not define what is meant by meaningful public participation").
38. Miller supra note 5; Anita P. Miller. The Western Front
Revisited. 26 URB. L~w. 845 (1994). For an interesting perspective on
the context and history of the comparable, earlier Sagebrush
Rebellion, see Cowart & Fairfax supra note 6.

The "dominant federal' model's dependence
upon political boundary lines and single-use designations 2 defies well-accepted precepts of conserva-
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tion biology 3 and biodiversity protection, 44 as well
as notions of "sustainability." 45 The model .rests
upon the notion that species can be protected in
perpetuity through management in isolated preserves, even though the preserve's boundaries are
permeable, its conditions and residents always in
flux. 46 The model's reliance upon a commodity sta-

bility strategy, which emphasizes commodity extraction as the sole interest of public lands commuriities, conflicts with and threatens the emerging
amenity-based foundation of the new western econ-
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resources. The formalism of this process, together

with its bipolar and essentially adversarial structure, 50 imposes multiple barriers to participation by
inchoate, diversified communities. The common
practice of land managers under the "dominant federal" model to record the voices from these diverse
communities as "little more than chits on a tally
sheet"Si is contributing to the crisis in public confidence in the ability of the federal government to
52
manage public domain lands.

this new economy are also undermining the model's
legal systems and institutions that cater to com49
modity extraction interests.
The process by which decisions are made about
the management and allocation of public resources
on public lands has remained largely closed to
broad-based citizen participation and heavily
weighted toward special interests with their greater

The "dominant federal" model causes significant tensions on the nation's public lands. The
model also presents substantial barriers to rational
ecosystem management and enhanced communitybased involvement in the decisionmaking process
affecting these lands. These problems undermine
the model's positive features, namely the theoretical prospect that its application will achieve national norms and prevent inter-state distributional
inequities. But, do models proposing a more coop-

43. Noss, supra note 9 (conservation biology's adaptive management practices are at odds with recognizing law's need for
boundary certainty).

is based, has sustained a set of practices and policies that have
historically favored large, single interests which are now asynchronous with modern values. See WILKINSON, supra note 15.

44. Biodiversity protection also requires site-specific,
decentralized decisionmaking. However, devolution of these
functions to local government offers the potential of even greater
habitat fragmentation and more intense controversies about
prospective land use. Local governments additionally lack the
regulatory authority and revenue to do the iob. A. Dan Tarlock,
Local Government Protection of Blodiversity: What is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI.
L. REv. 555 (199).

50. Marcus E. Ethridge comments that the administrative
process, with its procedures designed under the influence of legal
values and doctrines, is clearly "better suited to producing effective adversanal arrangements with appropriate protection of private rights than to creating avenues for public involvement In
policy making." Marcus E. Ethridge, Procedures for Citizen Involvement
in Environmental Policy: An Assessment of Policy Effects, In CrrizEN
PARTICIPATION
INPusuc DEcisioN MAKING 115, 128-29 (lack DeSario
& Stuart Langton eds., 1987).

omy.47 Regional demographic changes 48 underlying

45. For further discussion of the effect of notions of sustainability on the management of public lands, see Robert B.
Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem
Management, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293 (1994); Keiter, supra note 13;
l.B. Ruhl. Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of
Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely
Different, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555 (1995); GENERALACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUB. No. GAO/RCED-94-I 1i, ECOSYSEM MANAGEMENT. ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEOUATELY
TEST APROMISING APPROACH (1994).
46. Rodgers, supra note 12, at 890 (stating that natural systems resist law-sanctioned boundaries between iurisdictions,
between private and public property holders, and between historically sanctioned entitlements and future needs).
47. Rasker, supra note 17. at 397. According to Bates, the
National Forest Service's commodity stability policy which
emphasizes commodity extraction as the sole interest of public
lands communities, ignores the multiplicity and diversity of these
communities. See Bates, supra note 16.
48. Such changes include increasing urbanization, the growIng political power of recreationists and preservationists, and the
appearance of multiple public lands communities. Rasker writes
about the "footloose techno-yuppies with portable computers" or
"modem cowboys," who have made policies of multiple-use sustained-yield begin to lose their meaning." Rasker, supra note 17, at
396. Cowart and Fairfax note that these changes are also providing an impetus for states to affect greater interest in increasing
state fiscal and environmental controls over public lands
resources. See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6.
49. Wilkinson also describes at great length the extent to
which the legal system, upon which the dominant federal model

51. Rasker, supra note 17, at 393 (quoting Sarah F Bates,
Discussion Paper: The Changing Management Philosophies of the Public
Lands, in W. LANDS REP. No. 3 (1993)). Rasker goes on to point out
that this "head-counting" approach to conflict resolution actually foments polarization and conflict, and according to Wilkinson,
is exploited by the federal land management agencies so that
they can be seen as a "compromising, reasonable, middle of the
road entity." Id. (quoting Charles F Wilkinson, Toward an Ethic of
Place, in BEYOND THE MYrHIc WEST 71, 74 (1990)),
52. Both Rasker and Flournoy write about the need for natural resource managers to adopt different analytical techniques
to account for the ever-increasing complexity of our relationship
to the natural environment; techniques, which are predicated
upon the existence of many different public lands 'communltles
and are responsive to their needs. Rasker believes that the market-based approach merits serious attention as an additional
management tool to be applied selectively as a supplement to
the scientific and public participation models of management.
Rasker supra note 17, at 393-96. While Flournoy favors the "multiple alternative-multiple attribute analysis developed by a working group convened by the federal government for the systematic identification and assessment of the values affected by wetlands alterations. Alyson C. Flournoy, Coping with Complexity, 27
Loy. LA. L. REV. 809, 817-19 (1994), One of the advantages,
Flournoy notes in the multiple alternative-multiple attribute
model is that it provides not only decislonmakers, but members
of the public with a clear view of the policy choices to be made,
making regulatory decisions more accessible to the public and
therefore, more democratic, which, In turn, may increase public
acceptance of regulatory decisions. Id.at 823.
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erative mode of governance offer any better
prospect?
III. Alternative Models of Cooperative Federalism
The article examines three "cooperative federalism" models found in other areas of environmental
law.53 The first is the "dual regulation" or "state primacy" model, under-which states are administratively delegated regulatory primacy to enforce federal
laws through existing state laws and institutions.
The second is the "collaborative management" or
"consensus-based" model, under which a joint federal, multi-state institution is created for the sole
purpose of developing consensus derived plans that
will be used by the various jurisdictions to manage
federally designated natural resources. The final
model is the "layered federalism" or "consistency"
model, under which individual states develop and
administer natural resource management plans with
which proposed federal activities must be consistent. 54 An analysis of each of these models shows
that at least two of them offer some advancement
over the existing "dominant federal" model and thus
suggest some direction for improvements to it.55
A. "The State Primacy" or"Dual Regulation" Model
The first model is the state primacy or "dual regulation" model used by the federal pollution control
laws. Under this model, federal regulatory authority
is administratively delegated to states with federally
53. While it will be quickly apparent, even from the abbreviated descriptions of the three alternative models set forth in the
text above, that each contains features of the other and even of
the "dominant federal" model, they are still sufficiently different
from each other and the existing model to warrant the comparative analysis undertaken in the Article.
54. For a discussion of the perils of using either the "dual
regulation" or layered federalism" models to regulate the conversion of wetlands, see Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland,
Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegationcl Clean
VaterAct Section 404 and Related Programs to the States. 54 MD. L. REv.
1242 (1995).
55. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the problems
identified in both the current -dominant federal" model and three
alternative models are attributable to defects In the models
themselves or to the individuals working within the models. As
such an analysis would move this Article far beyond its intended
purpose, this confounding factor is merely noted here as one warranting further examination before the "chairs are rearranged on
the decks of the Titanic."
56. The classic example of this model can be found in § 402
of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994) (national
pollution discharge elimination system permits).
57. See. e.g.. CNVA § 106. 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1994) (grants to
states and interstate agencies to assist them in administering
programs for the prevention, reduction and elimination of pollution. including enforcement directly or through appropriate state
law enforcement officers or agencies).
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approved programs giving the states de jure primary
regulatory authority to implement federal directives.56 Federal funds are granted annually to offset
the costs of administering the federal program.51
The "dual regulation" model, at least facially.
offers substantial enhancement of the state role in
administering federal laws, as state agencies, laws
and courts replace their federal equivalents.
However, although states develop, implement and
enforce their own regulatory programs under this
model, these programs must be consistent with (at
least as stnngent as) their federal counterpart."3 To
assure this result, the federal government closely
oversees state compliance with federal standards 59
and retains authority to reassert federal jurisdiction, restrict or condition federal funding of the
state program, or enforce directly, if state performance is deemed derelict 60 Although the -dual regulation" model has some positive features, chief
among which is the prospect that its insistence on
uniform standards will achieve national norms and
avoid inequities among the states, the model has
some serious deficiencies making its application to
public domain lands problematic .61
The first of these problems is its uneasy historical fit with the public lands experience, despite the
fact that both models rest on a presumption of federal authority to regulate the activities proscribed by
Congress.62 The very practical reasons behind delegating primary jurisdiction to implement pollution
control laws to the states, i.e., the nation's size and
58. Sem. e.g., CWA § 510. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994) (states may
not adopt or enforce standards which are "less stnngent than"
federal standards). Stewart chafes at this dictating of conduct
within other Institutions and recommends instead the use of
Indirect methods, such as transferable pollution credits, to
achieve the desired "strategic coupling" of the institution's decisions with national norms and goals. Stewart. supra note 25. at
352-53. To the extent that this arrangement might also be viewed
as -commandeering" the legislative and administrative processes
of state governments, the specter of New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144. 156. (1992). must be countered with. See Powell.
supra note 22 (criticizing the Courts historical analysis); Althouse.
supra note 25 (exploring recent evolution in Courts federalism
jurisprudence revealing its points of convergence, but ultimate
divergence over its meaning).
59. Sme. eg,. CVA § 402(d). 33 U.SC. § 1342(d) (1994) (federal review ofstate-issued national pollution discharge elimination
system permits).
60. Se. e.g., CNA § 402(c). 33 U.SC. § 1342(c) (1994) (criteria for withdrawal of federal approval of state national pollution
discharge elimination system permit programs).
61. This feature is of particular importance in the field of pollution control, where the concern is that the absence of a strong
federal presence will result in "an uneven playing field dotted with
pollution havens." Houck& Rolland. supra note 54. at 1299-1300.
62. The extent to which states may be compelled to implement federal directives premised on Commerce Clause lunsdiction has been thrown into question by several recent US.

Hope M.Iobxock

nVoue
3,Number 2

geographic diversity, the close relationship between
pollution and land use (long-considered a local prerogative), 63 the federal government's limited
resources, and the states' previous experience
administering laws of this type, only partially resonate with the public lands experience. 64 Although
there is diversity among the types of public domain
lands and their acreage is vast, the "dominant federal" model requires fewer federal resources to administer than are required for the administration of pollution control programs regulating millions of individual sources. 65 Further, no argument for state primacy on public lands based on experience or local
prerogative can be made, because the prevailing
"dominant federal" model excluded (and still
excludes) the states from any meaningful management role. Thus, the state experience administering
pollution control laws at the state level before the
1970s was significantly more substantial, although
less felicitous,66 than the state experience managing
resources on state public67 and school trust lands.6 8

The "dual regulation" model also has some serious design deficiencies which might lessen its effectiveness when applied to the nation's public domain
lands. First, the model tries unsuccessfully to synthesize two inherently conflicting goals-state primacy and the achievement of national norms. This
tension often emerges in matters involving state
enforcement of federal pollution control mandates.
States generally prefer a more cooperative, flexible
approach toward environmental enforcement than
allowed under the federal law. State agencies want
to accommodate local industries and are sensitive
to local political pressure. Federal agencies, mindful
of federal mandates that specifically disallow "local"
considerations, 69 walk a tightrope between the
state's desire for flexibility and the national need for
70
uniformity and consistency.
Further, a governance design, in which one
lurisdiction takes the lead in developing policies
the other has primary responsibility for implementing, is bound to cause conflict. 7 Indeed, the feder-

Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Flonda v.
Florida, 64 U.S.L.W. 64 (March 26, 1996) (holding Congress lacks
power under Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court); Lopez
v. United States. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down the Gun
Free School Zones Act on the ground it exceeded Congress'
Commerce Clause authority since possession of a gun in a local
school zone is not an economic activity substantially affecting
interstate commerce); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (holding unconstitutional "take title" provision of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 to the
extent it "commandeered" the legislative processes of the states).

total land mass of the United States. These lands Include approximately 20 million acres of lands designated as forests and 13%
of the lands used for grazing under government (federal or state)
control. Excluding Alaska, state agencies control nearly as much
land as federal agencies dedicated to propagation of fish and
wildlife, but a significantly smaller fraction of the total land dedicated to public park use. Pusuc LAND LAw REviEw COMMIssION,
STATE
LAND REsouRCES AND PouciEs. at S-I, S-2 (1970), More recent
information about the acreage administered by the states can be
found in WESTERN STATELAND COMMISSIONERS ASSOciATION, 1991-92
DIRECTORY.
tbl. 1(1992) (states hold more than 45 million acres),
quoted inBruce & Rice, supra note 41, at 2. See also Sally K. Fairfax
et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Convenlonal Wisdom, 22
ENVTL. L. 797, 832 (1992) (41 million acres managed as grant
lands).

63. Wickersham, supra note 25 (dominant model of land use
regulation in this country is local control of land use through
"Euclidean" zoning).
64. It is interesting to note that these reasons resulted in
state regulatory primacy to administer pollution control programs, even though there was a sense with regard to federal regulatory and social programs in general that the national govemment's performance would be superior to that of the states and
that federal programs were correctives for state and local neglect
and local entrenchment of privilege. Stewart, supra note 25, at 340.

68. For example, Fairfax et al. find in state management of
school trust lands, models and approaches to public resource
management that might "enrich discussions of public resource
management now dominated by desiccated and polarized Issues
arising at the federal level." Fairfax et al., supra note 67, at 803. See
also Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6. For critical views of state land
management, see Heidelberg, supra note 41, at 1582 (current
framework governing management of state school lands should
be modified); Bruce & Rice, supra note 41. at 23-26 (land management policies of western states is lagging behind times
because states view public lands primarily as income source and
believe their resources are perpetual).
69. Melnick &Willes, supra note 66, at 235.
70. lames Elder, former Director, EPA Office of Water
Enforcement and Permits, has described this relationship as
"EPA's tightrope walk between the need for national consistency
and state flexibility in implementation: lames R.Elder, Regulation
of Waler Quality: Is EPA Meeting Its Obligations or Can the Stales Belier

65. To give the reader an idea of the enormity of the regulatory universe administered by the states, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency collects information under vanous federal pollution control laws about more than 30,000 abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, 328 toxic chemicals released to the air,
water and land from more than 17.000 manufactunng facilities, and
has a database for water quality information alone that contains
over 170 million data points on surface and groundwater quality,
sediments, streamflow, and fish tissue contamination, which provides Information on which regulatory programs pnncipally adminIstered by the states are based. COUNOcL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.
supra note 40, at 260-61.
Meet Water Quality Challenges?, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL
VERsus STATEENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: CAN A NATIONAL
66. Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy Store:
Poucy BE IMPLEMENTED LOCALLY? 20 (1990).
EPA Overfiling of Local Air Pollution Variances, 20 EcoLOY LO. 207,
253-54 (1993) (noting reluctance of state and local districts to
71. See generally E. Donald Elllott, Federal Versus State
enact stringent environmental regulations).
Environmental Protection Standards: Can a National Policy Be Implemented
67. According to a 1970 survey conducted by the Public
Land Law Review Commission, states administer about 4% of the

Locally? Keynote Presentation: Making the Partnership Work, 22 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10.010 (1992); Melnick &WIlles. supra note 66;
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al-state relationship in the "dual regulation" model
has been burdened almost to the point of disability
by allegations of inconsistent federal oversight and
micro-management of state programs, wasteful
duplication of effort, delayed and conflicting decisions, and lack of finality.72
The "dual regulation" model, with its reluctant
sharing of power with the states, has not productively synthesized the conflicts between the two junsdictions23 The model's concentric, overlapping power
shanng structure reflects an inherent distrust of state
performance, a distrust almost as great as that reflected in the "dominant federal" model that grants states
no role at all in the administration of federal land
management programs. A model that is premised on
distrust of the state partner and results in strained
inter-governmental relationships would be 74no
improvement over the "dominant federal" model.
In addition, the political unpopularity of federal oversight "sticks"75 and limited federal resources

supporting their use results in uneven, often ineffective federal oversight. Ineffective federal oversight of state performance curtails the federal government's capacity to counter-balance excessive
state responsiveness to local political and economic pressure. This puts at risk the model's ability to
achieve national norms and avoid distributional
inequities among the several states, undermining
the theoretical advantages of the model. 76 At the
same time, the pressure to maintain national norms
makes the federal government uneasy about
approving experimentation and diversity in state
regulatory programs37 Therefore, the "dual regulation" model might inhibit federal land managers
from responding to the need for regional variations
in natural resource management strategies.
The "dual regulation" model does not correct
the problems caused by the fragmentation of natural systems by political boundaries, since it preserves
the state as the decisionmaking unit.7 8 The "dual.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OIECE, PUB. No. GAOIRCED-95-64. EPA AND

tury. Kramer. supra note 22. For a modern-day affirmation of
Madison's vision of where the most relevant political authority
would reside for citizens, see 11 at 1504 (stating that the aw that
most affects people in their daily lives is still overwhelmingly
state law).

THE STATES: ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGES REQUIRE A BElIER WORIUNG

(1995). For a more salutary view of the ameliorative
effects of this conflict, see Houck and Rolland who label as "acddental genius" the dual agency review model of the federal wetlands permitting program, the protective qualities of which are
further enhanced by the participation of other federal and state
agencies as well as the public. They attribute to the model a "creative tension" that helps offset the power of money, influence and
private property nghts and warn that "rainy regulatory program
that vests decision-making authority exclusively In one agency
runs a great nsk of failure. Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at
1312.
RELATIONSHIP

72. GENERA AccoUNiNG OricE, supra note 71. The states
additionally complain that federal funds and technical assistance
are insufficient to offset the burden of being the pnmary regulatory authority. For an analysis of EPA overfiling of local alr pollution variances, including the reasons why EPA engages In this
practice, see Melnick & \'illes. supra note 66. Yet complete
absence of federal oversight would be as inappropnate on public
lands as it would be under the pollution control laws given the
need in both situations for national uniformity to avoid Industry
forum shopping and inequity among the several states. Richard
B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism In Mandating
State Implementation of NationalEnvironmental Policy, 86 YALE Li. 1196
(1977).
73. This concept of "sharing power" with the states might
have been baffling to the Framers of the Constitution, who.
although they shared the assumption that sovereignty was unitary and exclusive and, therefore either the national Congress or
state legislatures had to predominate, during the course of the
debates grew to accept the idea that both the central (or national) government and the states could exercise sovereignty In their
separate spheres. Consistent with that vision. Madison argued
that the greatest sphere of government activity would be at the
state level. However. anti-Federalists feared the effect of
Madison's vision of federalism would be to reduce states to the
status of towns, retaining only the power to levy taxes, and to create a consolidated national government. Powell, supra note 22. at
656 n. 117. See generally id. at 652-64. According to some scholars,
power sharing is a natural outgrowth of the structural, administrative. cultural, and political forces at play in the twentieth cen-

.74. Although the "dual regulation" model appears to disperse power more than the "dominant federal- model, reducing
the capture possibilities, in actuality there Is no difference. BLMI
administers its programs through field offices in the several
states and thus presents as dispersed a target as the state natural resource or land management agencies.
75. Sre. e.g.. CWA § 402(c). 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1994)
(resumption of federal primacy); CWA § 106(fj(2). 33 US.C. §
12561f)12) (1994) (conditioning or reduction of federal grants);
Clean Air Act (CAA) § 179(a). 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (1994) (highway
funds are cut off for non-attainment areas).
76. For example, as Melnick and Willes point out revocation
of state enforcement authority under the CA would be unwise
because the states do 70. to 90% of all enforcement under that
law. Melnick & Villes, supra note 66. at 246.
77. Various mechanisms In the "dual regulation" model
allow for site-specific adjustments to national standards (e4g..
state water quality standards and state implementation plans
under the CAA) and local experimentation (variances) and provide some accommodation between local needs and national
standards. Some commentators criticize these devices because
the over'arching goals of a program (i.e., Its national norms) tend
to get lost In ad hoc process of examining the equities In individual cases. Melnick& Willes. supra note 66. at 254.
78. For a discussion of how Insensitive and inadequate the
pollution control laws are with respect to preserving biodiversity
see Ion D.Hoist, 11 e Unfamizabffly Factor: FedralLanids. Mananngfir
Uncertainly.and t r Pw navtbn cf BLL-fraI Dhiasity, 13 PuB. L;D L
REv. 113 (1992). Se, aso GE ERAl. Accou.iG OmcE, Pua. No.

GAO/RCED-96-42. WATER POLimo.I: D;n-.EucEs A.o%, THE
STATES IraIssuL':,G PzELrrs LLo.!m*.:o THE D~sawc- or Poummris
(1996) (explaining that variations in discharge limits or in standards and procedures used to derive these limits, have been the
source of concem, particularly when neighboring junsdictions
share water bodies).
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regulation" model allows states to develop regulatory regimes that reflect a state's priorities with respect
to use of the ambient environment.7 9 These regimes
can bisect an inter-state resource like a river or an
airshed, artificially dividing the ambient environment at the state's boundary. 80 Only rarely does the
model allow for regional planning or standard setting8l opening only a very small window for implementing the cross-jurisdictional, landscape-orient82
ed protection favored by conservation biologists.
Further, as principally a creature of the administrative state, the content and contours of the "dual
regulation" model, even more than those of the
"dominant federal" model, are formed, shaped and
reformed through the formalism of the administrative process.8 3 This formalism, together with the
bipolar and adversarial nature of administrative
proceedings and their dependence on "specialized
scientific knowledge, technical largon,"84 and
lawyers, creates multiple barriers to public participation, 85 especially by inchoate, fragmented community-based interest groupings. 86 Studies have
shown that elaborate administrative procedures
have had little success in democratizing administrative decisionmaking. 87 What public access is pro-

duced is systematically unrepresentative of the
public interest and favors interests that are already
influential.8 8 For example, public hearings, when
they do occur, often occur late in the decision making process, at inconvenient times (i.e., during
working hours), are inhibiting in format, and frequently pit ordinary citizens against technical
experts from the agency or applicant. 89 The agencies
administering these proceedings have neither the
flexibility nor resources to respond, other than in
the most superficial way, to the cacophony of voices heard in typical public hearing or formal written
submission.90 The process responds best to the
entrenched, familiar voices that collect around unified positions.9 =
There is little reason to expect, therefore, that
transferring the "dual regulation" model to public
domain lands would eliminate problems with the
"dominant federal" model. The model might even
exacerbate existing federal-state tensions on public
domain lands and lead to further erosion of national norms despite the theoretical promise of the
reverse result. The model does nothing to eliminate
the existing politically fragmented natural landscape, and its complete dependence on the admin-

79. This is the concept behind the CAAs state implementation plan (SIP). 42 U.S.c. § 7410 (1994). See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246 (1976). Allowing states to localize national standards
also underlies the concept of state water quality standards found
in the CWA. 33 U.S.c. § 1313 (1994). See also 33 U.S.C. 4
131 (bj(I)(C) (1994) (water quality based effluent limits).
80. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). See

participants in the administrative process. Robert B, Reich, Public
Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 Yale L I,
1617, 1624 (1985). Fora general discussion of the administrative
process, see lames T. Harrington & Barbara A. Frick, Opportunities
for Public Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 15 NAT, RESORCrS
LAw. 537 (1983).

also GENERAL AccouNlING OFFICE,
supra note 78 (explaining that van-

ations in discharge limits or standards and procedures used to
denve these limits, have been the source of concern, particularly
when neighbonng jurisdictions share water bodies). Another
example of states being unable to manage a resource collectively can be found in the debates over the adoption of the zero emission vehicle (ZEV) as the standard for emissions of ozone precursors in the Northeast. Susan Bruninga, Air Pollution: OTC Reaffirms
Support for 49-State Car, States Rights, DAILY ENVT REP.,Mar. 1, 1995;
Jennifer Silverman, Air Pollution: Individual States Remain Adamant
About ZEV Mandate. Despite Big Three Letter, DAILY ENV'T REP.,
July 13,
1995; Air Pollution: Decision on Auto Plan for Northeast Delayed Until
Mid-December Agency Says. DAILY ENV'T REP.. Nov. 18. 1994.
81. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1994) (convening of interstate management conference to address interstate water quality
problems); id. 4 1288 (areawide waste treatment management
plans); Id.4 1289 (river basin plans)

86. The administrative and judicial processes require participant to distill their Interests Into highly focused, oppositional
statements or positions. Although one may be able to identify
discrete public lands communities, these communities are made
up of many people with different interests and values which cannot easily be reduced to single, unitary positions. Bates, supra
note 16. See also Reich. supra note 85, at 1624.
87. Ethridge, supra note 50, at 115, 122. Ethridge goes on to
say "citizen participation encouraged by formal hearing procedures has not often contributed to the 'complicated, creative balancing of conflicting interests in controversial areas,' Instead, It
has frequently served to make discussions of public policies
more ideological, more difficult, and less representative of the
broader public interest." Id.at 124.
88. Ethridge, supra note 50, at 115. 129 (quoting Walter A.
Rosenbaum, The Paradoxes of Public Participation,
Administration and Society 8:3:355-83 (1976)).

83. For examples of this formalism in the CWA, see CWA 44
402(b)(3). (c)(3), 33 U.S.C. 4§ 1342(b)(3). (c)(3) (1994) (state program delegation and federal resumption of regulatory iunsdiction, respectively). See also CWA § 309(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. 4 1319(g)(4)
(1994) (enforcement).

89. jurisdictional standing to secure judicial review of
administrative decisions, the technicality and complexity of the
record, costs, and other procedural formalities create barriers to
public participation under this model. Owen M. Fiss, Comment,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073-78 (1984); Melanie
Rowland, Bargaining for Life: Protecting Biodiverslty Through Mediated
Agreements, 22 ENVTL. L. 503, 519 (1992).

84. Thomas L. Van Valey & James C. Petersen, Public Service
Centers: The Michigan Expenence, in CmzEN PARTICIPATION
IN PUBLIC
DECISION MAYNG 39 (lack DeSano & Stuart Langton eds., 1987).

90. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. See also Bates,
supra note 16, at 91 (noting that most public hearings are
arranged to impede community consensus).

82. Hoist. supra note 78, at 133.

85. Jurisdictional bramers, such as standing, and the need to
develop a persuasive administrative record impose real costs on

91. Reich. supra note 85, at 1624.
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istrative process for making decisions may erect
additional bamers to diversified, community-based
public participation in the public lands management decsionmakrng process.
B. The "Federal-State Consensus" Or "Collaborative
Management" Model
The second model is the federal-state consensus or "collaborative management" model employed
by the Clean Water Act's National Estuary Program.9 2
Under this model, the federal government funds and
facilitates the development of an institution to develope a plan to address the environmental and
resource depletion problems caused by unregulated
human activities in the estuary.93 There is much to
commend in this model for the management of public domain lands.
First, estuanes and public domain lands share
common historical predicates. Both are multi-jurisdictional and have histoncally functioned as unregulated
commonsY4 Federal land holdings in many parts of the
West are neither unified nor integrated, but inter-mixed
with state and private inholdings. 5 Further. develop92. 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994). The progenitor of the federalstate consensus model found in the National Estuary Program Is
the interstate management plan developed by Maryland. Virginia.
Pennsylvania. and the District of Columbia to restore and protect
the Chesapeake Bay. For a detailed chronology of the development of that plan and the Chesapeake Bay program, see Malone
A. Hutter. The Chesapeake Bay: Saving a Naion'al Resource Through
Multi-State Cooperation, 4 VA.1.
NAT.RsouRcas L 186 (1985).

93. Agricultural. industrial, muniapal, recreational, and
other activities on the land can both directly and indirectly affect
estuarine water quality and hydrodynamics. Both atmospheric
and land based pollutants can concentrate in and be retained by
an estuary. Robert D.Hayton. Refltions on the Estuanne Zone, 31 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 123. 136 (1991). According to Hayton. these problems
have brought on a crisis of global proportions. Id.at 125.
94. The estuanne zone is not sharply delineated, but like
any ecosystem is a dynamic, sometimes turbulent, and often
extensive region. Thus, many states may find themselves in the
estuanne zone even though their citizens may not directly benefit from its existence. For a description of the estuarine (or interface) zone and the value of estuanne systems, see Id.
95. As pointed out by Cowart and Fairfax, surface title is not
the only complexity in the pattern of western land ownership as
a result of the federal practice of retaining subsurface mineral
rights when it deeded away land to homesteaders and ranchers.
Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6.at 410-12.
96. Id. at 410 (noting particularly the contentiousness of
access to federal lands surrounded by state or private lands).
97. Again, according to Cowart and Fairfax .the reality of
western land ownership patterns invites (some might say
requires) some level of state and local involvement In the management of public domain lands and resources. Id.The theoretical framework for these observations can be found in the work of
Grodzins and others. MORTON GRODZINs. THE AmEUCAN S iT: A
NEW ViEw OF GovERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATEs (1966), died In Fairfax
et al.. supra note 6.at 420 n.17. For further explication of this theoretical framework and its progenitors, see Kramer, supra note 22.
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ment on public lands is often tied to development on
nearby state and private landsY6 This checkerboard

pattern of intermingled land holdings continues today
making integrated management of public domain

lands a multi-jurisdictional challenge.97

Public domain lands have also historically func-

tioned as an unregulated commons, susceptible to
Hardin's "tragedy." 3 Although public domain lands
may not be a "true" or "legal' commons, as they are
subject to laws regulating their use and access, they
function as a de facto commons, because these laws
have not been consistently enforced 9 Unauthorized

use and access to these lands occurred historically
and continues to occur today.CO Therefore, the public domain lands experience appears to be more
congruent with the "collaborative management"

model than with the "dual regulation" model.
The multi-jurisdictional and un-regulated commons characteristics of estuaries resulted in the formulation of a collaborative, non-directive governance model, quite different in approach from the
"dominant federal" or "dual regulation" models.10 1
The National Estuary Program's "collaborative man98. Stz Garrett Hardin. The Trajdi, tJih Comrrons. 162 Sci ;CE
1243 (1963). repnnted In ?.t
mHE.Coa.v'ms (Garrett Hardin &
James Baden eds.. 1977) (where many actors share the same
resource, rational choice leads to the resource's eventual destruction. because an individual's short term gain exceeds her harm and
the harm to the resource can be dispersed among its many users).
99. James Huffman. T1.e irutafiuty tc Pnvte Rights in PuffiU
Lands, 65 U. Cow. L REv. 241. 259 (1994). Huffman argues that
well into the tw.entieth century most non-commodity resources,
like wildlife. hiking. camping, and boating, were free for the takIng. Id.at 260. These unauthorized uses were then legitimized by
the preemption lavs, Id.at 259 (discussion of preemption laws).
Huffman goes on to argue that unlimited equal access will lead
to the tragedy of the commons and its destruction, and while limling equal access may alleviate distributional and degradation
problems, this can only be accomplished at an unacceptably high
cost to average individual welfare. 11. at 271.
100. For example, the failure of BLM to control access by
cattle to public domain lands makes the public lands a commons
for that purpose and. according to most experts. is the reason for
the loss of hundreds of millions of acres of and and semi-and
land In the western United States. George C. Coggins, Lrwtcoi
Grazing on tf.e PuAY4 Lands. Leassns from the Failure cf Offlal
Consme'aiisn. 20 Go:z.a L Rav. 749 (1934-85); Coggins et al•. TL,L'w
cf PubUr Rangelad Mara gment I:Th. Extent and Ditrifu bn cI Fedral
Porer 12 Eumr. L 535 (1982): Myra Klockenbnnk. The New Range
War Has f.e Daert as a Fc. N.Y. TLUaS. Aug. 20. 1991. at C-4.
101. Under our constitutional system of govemment. one
state has no power to control another. and the federal sovereign
has neither the political will nor the resources to force a federal
solution on the states in an historically unregulated, multi-state
commons. For examples of unsuccessful attempts by states to
control water pollution in adjacent states, see Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U, 91 (1992); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois. 451
US. 304 (1981). For a discussion of some other examples of
regional planning by states, see Paul D. Banker. Jr., Note. The
Chsapea Bayg
Premalbitn Act: Tri ProfLsn WthiState Land Regulatfin
cf Interstate Rrsourre, 31 W & MuA' L REv. 735.739-44 (1990).
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agement" model establishes an institutional framework and process for preparation of a multi-state
plan to restore and maintain the ecological integrity of designated estuarnes1 02 The plan is prepared
under the aegis of a "management conference"
composed of representatives from all affected political jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state and local governments and inter-state governmental entities)
and interests in the estuarine zone. 103 Management
plans can only be approved by the federal government upon concurrence by the affected states' governors.iO 4 Once approved, any federal action must
05
be consistent with the plan.'
The "collaborative management" model, on its
face, provides for significant reductions in federalism tensions. The parties operate in an non-hierarchical (i.e. the requirement for state concurrence),
cooperative effort to design a solution to what is
perceived to be a shared problem.i0 6 This contrasts
sharply with the hierarchical, non-parity, directive
federal-state relationship in both the "dominant federal" and "dual regulation" models. Under-the "collaborative management" model, the federal government functions as a facilitator, not an overseer, of
state and local participation, as opposed to performance, and as a provider of technical and financial
resources to aid in plan development. Acceptance of

the plan at the local level is enhanced because of
direct participation in plan design by state and local
governments and the increased likelihood such participation has resulted in a document more sensitive
to state and local concerns.
However, the consensus process can also generate substantial transaction costs' 07 and result in
a compromised final product 08 There are no controlling norms guiding federal approval of the plan,
no requirement that the plan even meet federal
standards, unlike the "dual regulation" model.i09
Therefore, there is no way of assuring that distributional inequities between estuaries in different
parts of the country will not be created. Further,
plan implementation depends upon the voluntary
cooperation of affected jurisdictions and must
await separate action by state and local governments conforming their laws to whatever new standards or procedures are required by the plan.' i0The
management conference has no continuing function once the plan is approved.
The "collaborative management" model, however, does a significantly better job than either the
"dominant federal" or "dual regulation" models of
removing the barriers to rational ecosystem management, because it offers a trans-political boundary institutional framework (the management con-

102. As part of the plan development process, the management conference assesses trends in the estuary's water quality
the viability of its natural resources and designated uses, collects
and analyzes data on the causes of the estuary's decline, and provides for the coordinated implementation of the plan by federal,
state and local agencies. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1994). The
Conference also has the authority to determine the extent to
which federal projects and programs are consistent with the plan.

Interstate Cooperation, 102

103. States, federal agencies, regional and international
authorities, educational institutions, and interested members of
the public in the designated "estuanne zone" form the membership
of the Management Conference. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(c) (1994). Given
the breadth of the statutory definition of the term "estuanne zone."
(includes "associated aquatic ecosystems and those portions of
tributanes draining into the estuary up to the histonc height of
migration of anadromous fish or the histonc head of tidal influence, whichever is higher," 33 U.S.C. § 1330(k) (1994)). it is not
unreasonable to conclude that the intent of the drafters was to
include as many iunsdictions in the planning process as possible.
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(f) (1994).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(bl(7) (19941. The effect of the consistency mechanism under the collaborative management" model is
less clear than under the "layered federalism" model. Only those
programs which are listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance are covered by § 320(b)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b)(7)
(1994), and the mechanism is tied into a review process triggered
by Executive Order 12.372. repnnted as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 6506
(1994). While the Executive Order blocks implementation of
inconsistent federal programs, the Order is not codified in the
statute and is thus subiect to modification by subsequent presidents.
106. On the topic of inter-state cooperation and federalism
see Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal

HARV. L, REV 842 (1989). The authors
analysis of the National Association of Attorneys General vertical
restrain guidelines demonstrates how interstate cooperation preserves the core values of federalism (liberty civic participation,
and diversity).
107. The model requires the creation of a separate, new
institution (the management conference), multiple public hearings. and extensive information gathering and analysis. 33 U.S.c.
§ 1330 (1994). Reflecting the additional time it takes to create a
document by committee, most of the plans developed under this
model have taken in excess of four years to complete. HOWARD
RAiFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIAnON 215-55. See also
LAWRENCE SUSKIND & JEFFREYCRUIKSHANK. BREAKING THE IMPASSE:

10-15 (1987)
(identifying some of the questions raised by negotiating public
disputes).
108. Fiss, supra note 89. at 1073-78; Rowland, supra note 89,
at 519. See also Frank P. Grad. Alternative Dispute Resolution In
Environmental Law. 14 COLUM. 1.ENVTL. L. 157, 184 (1989) (ADR's
"win-win- trade-off is deceptive because If everyone gains, It Is
likely that someone not involved in the trade will have to pay and,
in the environmental field, the loser may well be the public Interest in preserving environmental resources for the future).
109. See 33 U.S.C. § 1330(f) (1994) (approval procedures for
the estuary plan requires inclusion of priority corrective actions
and compliance schedules to meet theCWA's aspirational goals).
110. The CWA relies on the prospect of federal financial
assistance to encourage plan implementation 33 U.S.C. 4
1330(f)(2) (1994). As an ultra-jurisdictional solution to a multistate problem, unless states voluntarily incorporate the directives of a management plan, the plan's implementation and
enforcement is totally dependent upon individual state enforcement authority, which cannot transcend political boundaries.
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES
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ference) for managing a regional resource. The goal
of the-model's planning process is to synthesize and
rationalize differences among the affected states in
how they manage the natural system; in other
words, to eliminate the artificial differences caused
by political boundaries. Most plans also provide for
future plan adjustments, allowing for conservation
biology's adaptive management."'
The structure of the "collaborative management" model's management conference, with its
many different participants and its use of a consensus, collaborative approach to decisionmaking (i.e.,
the planning process), encourages diversity of
views. A consensus approach is more open to different communities than the formal bi-polar, adversarial approach of the "dominant federal" and "dual
regulation" models.1 2 The democratic, more transparent nature of the planning process levels the
playing field between community-based interests
and special interests. The participation of community-based interests in the process also validates
and strentthens the interests they represent,
increasing public confidence in the final product.ii 3
While the "collaborative management" model
harbors some significant risks, such as high transaction costs, the possibility of a compromised final
product and sacrificed national norms as well as
implementation uncertainty, it offers a means to
overcome the federalism frictions now present on
public domain lands as well as the ecosystem management and public participation problems inherent in both the "dominant federal" and "dual regulation" models. The shared historical predicates
with the "dominant federal" model may also make
the imposition of this consensus driven model on
public domain lands an easier fit than the "dual regulation" model.
C. "Federal Consistency" Or "Layered Federalism"
Model
The third, and final model is the "federal con11i. Included in the plan are normative guidance (statutory
and regulatory standards) and shared aspirational goals, which
may reduce future conflicts. 33 U.S.C § 1330 (1994); 40 C.FR. §§
35.9000-35.9070 (1995).
112. Reich. supra note 85, at 1624 (discussing how current
practice of public policymaking ignores the views and interests of
poor and diffused groups). The author suggests that public deliberation is beneficial to these groups as it brngs them together
where they are able to recognize common interests and jointly
create new public values. Id.at 1635-36.
113. In addition, a consensus approach, in contrast to the
formalistic or adversarial approach of the 'dominant federal' or
-dual regulation' models, by encouraging examination of
assumptions, inclusive thinking and a means for finding common
ground among various interests, provides the ideal environment
in which to recognize differenit communities. Bates. supra note 16.
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sistency" or'layered federalism" model found in the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).ii 4 Under
this model, a state develops and administers a federally funded coastal resource management program that meets uniform federal standards.1is
Federal activities (both within and outside the program area) must be consistent with the state's program to the "maximum extent practicable" unless
contrary to the national interest.1 6 Like the "collaborative management" model, the "layered federalism" model has much to commend it.
The historical experience underlying the "layered federalism" model, however, is significantly different from the public lands' experience; closer to
that underlying the "dual regulation" model. The
states' ability to manage coastal areas was considered superior to that of the federal government,
because the states already had the necessary
resources, administrative machinery, enforcement
powers, constitutional authority, and experience to
do the job;" 7 historical predicates quite different
from the states' experience on public domain
lands.ii 8 Further. federal funds and the clear power
shift to the states was perceived as a means to correct past distributional inequity in the coastal zone,
where the nation as a whole had received the benefits of coastal development and the impacted states
bore all of the costs.ii 9 Perceived distributional
inequities on public lands have historically been
corrected or offset by federal funds, not by a redistribution of power.
While consistency between federal and state
programs is not an unfamiliar concept in the public
lands context, the public lands version is much
weaker than that employed in the "layered federal20
ism" model, more aspirational than controlling.
Under the "layered federalism" model, states can
veto a proposed federal initiative that is inconsistent with the states program, giving the states considerable leverage against the federal government
Under FLPMA, the federal planning process is mere114. 16 U.S.C §§ 1451-64 (1994).
115. For a recitation of those standards, see 16 U.SC. §
1455(d) (1994).
116. 16 U.S.C § 1456(c) (1994): Secretary of the Intenor v.
Califorla. 464 US. 312 (1984).
117. Beyle. supra note 25. According to Houck and Rolland.
the CZMA'presumes' coastal land use Is primarily a state affair.
and provides funding with only limited, programmatic federal
review of state performance. Houck & Rolland. supra note 54. at
1289.
118. S zsupra note 41 and accompanying text.
119. Martin 1. LaLonde. Note. AL cafing BurL'n cl Prcif to
Feffeuate L,.e Privalbn and Fedira4sm Gcatc
1Ift Ccastal Zone
Managrm'tn Act. 92 MicH. L RE,. 438 (1993).
120. Leshy, supra note 25, at 109.
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ly to be informed by state and local concerns.
BLM, not the states, makes the consistency finding
and BLM can relect a state or local standard, if the
interests of the federal government are not adequately preserved by that standard. 122 Reserving
this authority in the federal government reflects
congressional belief that the integrity of the governing federal laws and congressional policies should
not be compromised by conflicting local concerns, 123 a finding substantially at odds with the
congressional findings underlying the "layered fed24
eralism" model.
Although the "layered federalism" model
sounds similar in some respects to the "dual regulation" model, there are significant differences of
particular relevance to this analysis. The "layered
federalism" model is more truly a state-lead design
than the "dual regulation" model. The model envisions a strong role for state and local governments
in the program area. The state administers its
coastal zone program without federal intrusion or
even participation. 125 Although states must consid-

121. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994) ("ITIhe Secretary shall, to
the extent he finds practical, keep apprised of State, local, and
tribal land use plans."). Congress intended, among other things,
for FLPMA to increase the opportunities for state and local governments as well as the general public to partiapate in land management decisions. The Public Land Law Review Commission.
whose recommendations contributed to much of the content of
FLPMA, noted many reasons for increasing the role of state and
local governments in the public land decision making process,
including the need to allow for more effective resolution of problems such as depressed local tax revenues due to property tax
immunity of federal lands and zoning and pollution control problems on non-federal lands caused by uses of contiguous federal
lands. For a further discussion of this and other related points.
see Beyle, supra note 25, at 216.
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er federal interests in their individual draft plans
and conform to national criteria, they are largely left
free to develop and administer their programs without the federal government second-guessing
them. 26 And, while the federal government can
restrict or condition federal funding 27 and withdraw
plan approval, 28 just like it can in the "dual regulation" model, federal oversight of state performance
under this model is considerably less objectionable
to the states, because the traditional federal "sticks"
of the "dual regulation" model are substantially offset in the "layered federalism" model by the federal
29
consistency provision.
Further, since local concerns are elevated under
the model as a result of states being encouraged to
tailor their plans to meet local needs, 30 the federal
consistency model, like the collaborative management model, should also produce a product that is
sensitive to these needs, and, therefore, supported
by the local communities. Thus, the friction inherent
in the "dual regulation" model's heavy reliance on
federal oversight to achieve desired state perfor125. In contrast, under CWA § 402(d) each state with delegated authority to administer the national pollution discharge
elimination system permit program must submit to EPA a copy of
each permit application received by the state. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)
(1994). The state cannot issue a permit until QOdays have passed
without EPA noting its obiection to the permit.
126. The Secretary of Commerce cannot approve any state
management plan unless the views of federal agencies principally affected by the plan have been adequately considered, 16
U.S.C. § 1456(a) (1994), the plan provides for adequate consideration of national interests Involved In siting of energy facilities
which are of greater than local significance, Id,
§ 1455(d)(8), and
lands which are held in trust by or subiect solely to the discretion
of the federal government are excluded from the definition of
coastal zone," id. § 1453(1). See Beyle, supra note 25, at 211-12,

122. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994) (land use plans shall be
consistent with state and local plans to the maximum extent the
Secretary finds consistent with federal law and the purposes of
the Act). See also Beyle, supra note 25. at 216. Under the CZMA.
state or local authorities determine the consistency of federal
programs with state coastal zone management plans. 16 U.S.C. §
1456(c) (1994).

127. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c) (1994) (suspension of federal assistance if coastal state failing to adhere to management program or
grant terms).

123. Beyle, supra note 25, at 222 n.1 16 (quoting H.R. REP. No.
1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1976)). Beyle writes of the contradictory desire of Congress to bring states and local governments
into the federal land management process more which was tempered by an even stronger desire that federal primacy and control
over public lands was still considered essential given the prevailing state record on management of their own lands. Id.at 216-17.

129. State program authority to condition or reject outright
certain types of federal and federally-supported development has
been upheld against claims of preemption and interference with
interstate commerce. Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at 1297. See
also Michael A. Wolf, Accommodaling Tensions In ihe Coastal Zone, An
Introductionand Overview, 25 NAT. REsou.cEs LJ. 7 (1985),

124. A key to more effective protection and use of the land
and water resources of the coastal zone is to encourage states to
exercise their full authority over the lands and waters in the
coastal zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1994). Because of their proximity to and reliance upon the coast and its resources, the coastal
states have substantial and significant interests in the protection, management, and development of the resources of the
exclusive economic zone that can only be served by the active
participation of coastal states in all federal programs affecting
such resources. Id.§ 145 1(m).

128. Id. § 1458(d) (approval shall be withdrawn if coastal
state fails to cure defects in its compliance with Its management
program or grant terms).

130. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1994). Another example of the
extent to which the coastal zone management program Is, at
least, structured to be sensitive to local concerns can be found In
§ 306(d)(2)(B) in which states are enioined not only to establish
an "effective mechanism" for continuing consultation with local
governments to assure their full participation in Implementing
the state's coastal zone management program, but the mecha.
nisms themselves must provide for an opportunity for comment
by local governments in any situation where Implementation of
any management program decision would conflict with any local
zoning ordinance. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)(B) (1994).
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mance is not a significant factor in the "layered federalism" model.' 3' In fact, criticisms of the program
have less to do with its governance model than its
32
limited financial resources and overly broad scope.1
The reduction in federalism tensions, however
is not without cost. A state-lead program without
clear national standards and federal oversight, features of the "dual regulation" model can create substantial differences and inequities among the states
33
and be an invitation to industry forum shopping.
By allowing each state unfettered authority to
"resolve for its own coastal area basic choices
among competing uses for finite resources," 34 no
particular result in favor of any resource can be
assured, jeopardizing the achievement of national
norms favoring protection of those resources. 135
The "layered federalism" model's effectiveness
at controlling coastal development and limiting
environmental damage, just like the "dominant federal model." depends on coordination between the
various layers of government as well as among agencies within each layer.136 Yet, the consistency mechanism can be its own cause of conflict between the
various layers of government despite the fact its use
should trigger intra-state jurisdictional negotiations
and offer a way to eliminate inconsistent regulatory
requirements among the different jurisdictions within a state 3 7 Experience with the model reveals that
the different layers of government operate indepen131. Supervision of state performance and enforcement of
the Act by the federal government., although of a continuing
nature and comprehensive in scope, generally leads only to nonbinding suggestions for state program improvement. Mandatory
recommendations, according to Houck and Rolland, are restricted to process-onented improvements. The Secretarys only oversight stick is to suspend federal funding, if a state fails to adhere
to an approved program, and then only after an elaborate
process, which, again according to Houck and Rolland, serves as
both a shield against federal attempts to de-fund aggressive state
programs and against complaints of program violations In favor
of development interests. The CZMA provides no private federal
cause of action against states, local governments or private parties claimed to be in violation of state coastal management programs, therefore, citizen oversight over state program performance is limited as well. See generally Houck & Rolland. supra note
54. at 1294-99.
132. See Richard Hildreth & Ralph V. Johnson. CZM In
California, Oregon, and Washington, 25 NAT. REsouRcEs 1. 103 (1985)
(program's broad scope and federal resource limitations threaten
to enervate program or turn it into a one-issue program).
133. Inequities are also created among applicants as a result
of the enhancement of the states' powers and the dominance of
state and local concerns over national concerns. The states' ability to impose more stringent requirements can cause non-uniform
changes in regulatory burdens imposed on applicants by federal
laws, regulatory differences between coastal and non-coastal
states, and higher transaction costs. Scott C. Whitney et al.. State
Implementation of tie Coastal Zone Management Consistency
Provwsions-UltraVires or Unconstitutional?. 12 HRv. ENvrL L Rv. 67
(1988). cf. Beyle, supra note 25. at 214 (experience has shown CZMA
dispute resolution mechanism and the scheme of shared federal-
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dently of each other, with "tunnel vision" and a
myopic sense of territoriality. 33 This behavior can
result in duplicate programs, programmatic conflict,
turf wars, and less environmental protection, sounding remarkably like the experience under both the
"dominant federal" and "dual regulation" models. 139
However, these problems are experienced most
keenly at the state and local level. State-local tensions replace the federal-state tensions of the "dominant federal" and "dual regulation" models, turning
the model into a battleground for conflicting
philosophies over the distribution
of power between
4
state and local governments'1
Although, the "layered federalism" model is limited by state boundaries, like the "dominant federal"
and "dual regulation" models, the model holds
somewhat more promise for achieving rational
ecosystem management than might be expected.
The power to find parochial federal programs inconsistent with broader state natural resource goals and
the importance of local concerns create an opportunity for making rational ecosystem decisions in an
ecologically defined area within a state.'4' In addition, the planning approach underlying the "layered
federalism" model, as it underlies the "collaborative
management" model, and the absence of binding.
uniform standards, a feature of the "dual regulation"
model, allows for state experimentation and innovation, 142 and for conservation biology's adaptive man-

state control have acted to Inhibit such strategic beha'ior).
134. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly 632 F Supp. 1225.
1247 (D.Del. 1986).
135. Houck &Rolland. supra note 54. at 1299.
136. Ronald I. Rychlak, CoastalZone Mnagermentand the Search
for Interallon. 40 DEPAtL L REV. 981 (1991).
137. For a discussion of the dispute resolution mechanisms
In the Coastal Zone Management Act. see Beyle. supranote 25. at
212-14.
138. Rychlak, supra note 136, at 995. Sez afso Whitney et al..
supra note 133 (providing another highly critical view of the federal consistency provision).
139. Rychlak. supra note 136. at 996.
140. Rychlak. supra note 136. While there is some reason to
expect that the same dynamic might happen In the -collaborative
management" model with local Jurisdictions tying for powerwith
their states, the presence of non-governmental participants in
the planning process and the federal govemrnient as a facilitator
may act to lessen the likelihood dif this happening in that model.
14 1.This feature of the 'layered federalism model can be a
double edged sword with respect to protecting natural resources
of nationally recognized value like wetlands, as states can use
this authority to stop environmentally protective federal actions
as well as destructive ones.
142. Houck and Rolland emphasize the 'pliable nature of
notonly the federal standards governing approval of state coastal
programs, but also in how states structure their management
programs and define the extent of their coastal iurisdiction.
Houck Rolland, supra note 54, at 1294-95.
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agement principles to be applied. 143
The model is less inclusive of diverse public
voices than might be anticipated from its emphasis
on planning. Broad public participation is invited in
state plan formulation' 44 and state plans must
include procedures for public participation in the
permitting process as well as consistency determinations. 145 However, once the plan is approved, the
process becomes less inviting and inclusive and
more hierarchical and formal, replicating the barriers to participation by divers public communities
146
found in the "dual regulation" model.
Although the historical predicates behind the
federal consistency or "layered federalism" model
are less compelling when applied to the public
domain lands than the "collaborative management"
model, the "layered federalism" model does offer
some benefits. The model appears to reduce federal-state tensions, although, in practice, it may
merely transfer those tensions down a layer to state
and local governments. The model also offers some
potential for rational ecosystem management within a state and diversification of public participation
in the decisionmaking process. The model, however,
may cause high transaction costs for third parties,
and does not assure the fulfillment of national
norms with respect to protection of natural
resources or prevent distributional inequities from
occurring among the several states.
IV. Conclusion
This discussion should make clear that no single model discussed in this article offers a complete
panacea to the federalism tensions, ecosystem
management irrationality and lack of community
inclusivity afflicting public lands management
today as a result of the application of the "dominant
federal" model. The least curative approach, and
thus the least appealing substitute for the current
paradigm, is that offered by the "dual regulation"
model. Experience with the first model reveals that
its theoretical promises are largely chimerical.
The "collaborative management" and "layered
federalism" models, on the other hand, do offer
some advancements over the "dominant federal"
model. Enhanced state roles under these models
have led to a lessening of federal tensions as well as
143. According to critics of the "layered federalism" model.
the ad hoc, fragmented decisionmaking approach fostered by the
model is the antithesis of rational ecosystem decisionmaking.
Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal
Zone, 47 MD. L. REv. 358, 361 (1988). See also Rychlak, supra note
136, at 994-99.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(4) (1994) (state must hold public
heanngs in development of management plan).
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a greater opportunity for rational ecosystem management and more inclusive decisionmaking. At the
same time, application of these more cooperative
models of governance may make more problematic
the achievement of national norms and, at least with
regard to the "layered federalism" model, the avoidance of distributional inequities. Therefore, none of
these models warrants wholesale relocation to public domain lands without careful weighing of what Is
gained and lost in the substitution process.
If changes to the current public lands governance model are going to be made, however, it may
be more important to resolve the ecosystem management and public participation problems of the
"dominant federal" model than its federalism tensions. Friction in our federal system of government
has been in existence since the formation of the
republic. The mere fact that these tensions exist at
all on public lands, where there is no institutional
role for either state or local governments, is a testament to the endemic and persistent nature of the
problem under our system of government.
Examination of the three federalism models shows,
at most, a lessening of these tensions, but not their
complete disappearance. To hope for more, in the
case of public domain lands, therefore, may be to
hope for too much.
The same cannot be said, however, with respect
to overcoming the political and institutional barriers preventing rational ecosystem management and
democratic decisionmaking on public domain
lands. Unless these problems can be solved, the
biological and social communities that depend
upon those lands will wither and die. Therefore, features of the three models examined in this article
that remove these barriers should be looked at seriously in the redesign process, even if the models'
other attributes are not so promising.

145. Id. § 1455(d)(14).
146. Fora description of the dispute resolution mechanisms
of the CZMA showing both the formalism of those mechanisms
as well as their effectiveness at averting conflict and delay, see
Beyle, supra note 25, at 212-16. For a contrary view of the provision's conflict avoidance effectiveness, see Whitney et al., supra
note 133.

